Much has been said about the oppressive Mubarak police state, as well as the grinding struggles associated with overwhelming levels of poverty, unemployment, and hopelessness. But those leading the charge for a better system of government are not the poor, nor are they the especially religiously observant. Rather, the driving force appears to be frustration over corruption -- with upwardly-mobile, educated middle-class (and, indeed, Internet savvy) young people out front: the very ones who have the most to lose by the maintenance of the status quo.
To gain a more complete picture of the background and motivations of the Egyptian demonstrators, we examine public opinion data collected in Egypt in 2008 by the World Values Survey. The survey asked a nationally representative sample of over 3,000 Egyptians if they had ever attended, or would consider "attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations" -- and eight percent answered yes. If this number seems small, consider that the current population of Cairo is about seven million. Eight percent of that is approximately 500,000 individuals; which is, if anything, somewhat larger than the best current estimates of the number of protesters filling up the streets.
Of those who responded that they would protest, 45 percent were women. Yet one thing that has clearly emerged from the demonstrations is that the vast majority of people on the street are men. This should not come as much surprise, given reports of thugs and police groping and threatening rape against female protesters -- particularly as regime-perpetrated violence began to escalate. For this reason, though, we focus our attention on only the male portion of the survey sample.
Starting with Egyptian men as a whole, 12% said they would be willing to protest. Now let us narrow in on particular demographic subgroups. Each time, the percentage saying they would attend a demonstration increases significantly:
Men under age 35: 17%
...and with formal education: 18%
...and in upper-middle class: 31%
...and regular Internet user: 36%
...and interested in politics: 50%
In other words, those not only aggrieved -- but also aware and socially connected -- are the most likely to show up to protest.
Of the men who said they would demonstrate, 91% had a formal education, compared to 79% among those who said they would not demonstrate. 43% of those who said they would protest are younger than 35. And 27% are in the upper or upper-middle class. Fully 50% reported using a computer at least occasionally, compared to just 23% among those not willing to protest.
La vida política egípcia s'organitza a l'entorn de tres grans forces.
LA PRIMERA.- La que ha estat el motor de les manifestacions per exigir la sortida del president Mubarak. Està integrada per persones joves que no passen gana, educades i connectades amb el món a través de les xarxes socials. Per dir-ho sense embuts, es tracta de "privilegiats" que poden permetre's el luxe de reclamar la democràcia. D'aquest grup social és d'on van sorgir fa vint anys els líders del terrorisme islamista d'Al Qaeda i altres grups radicals. Està per veure si això encara és així, ja que l'actual generació ha vist el fracàs de la revolució iraniana i les conseqüencies del terrorisme islamista que, més enllà de l'11-S, ha mort més musulmans que occidentals.
LA SEGONA.- Els Germans Musulmans que, protegits darrere la primera força (políticament naïf i inexperta), intenta reintroduir-se en l'escena política per imposar la seva llei.
LA TERCERA.- La dels que viuen en barris desfavorits o en els pobles pobres de la vall del Nil, lluny de la mirada dels turistes i del "enviats especials". Una munió d'egipcis vinculats sentimentalment al patriotisme nasserià que odia tant a la burgesia cosmopolita del Caire o Alexandria com als barbuts islamistes que portarien Egipte a l'edat mitjana. Aquesta gent és la base social de Mubarak, al que consideren un hereu del coronel Gamal Abdel Nasser.
